Competition

USDOJ

Some CPTech and KEI blogs and cases:

1996

1996: Consumer Project asks the US Department of Justice to investigate West Publishing’s anticompetitive practices in legal publishing.

1996: Consumer Project and others oppose Thompson acquisition of West Publishing, and successfully seek acquisition of compulsory license on copyright claims to pagination of US court opinions.

1996: Letter to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, expressing opposition to Boeing McDonnell Douglas Merger, by Ralph Nader, Center for Study of Responsive Law and Essential Information. December 23, 1996.

1997

1997: Consumer Project on Technology successfully opposes merger between Staples and Office Depot.

1997: Consumer Project on Technology and others successively ask the US Department of Justice to bring antitrust case against Microsoft over it’s efforts to favor its Internet Explorer browser.

2000

2000: James Love, Antitrust Considerations and the Petroleum Industry, Center for Study of Responsive Law. Prepared Statement for hearing on: Solutions to Competitive Problems in the Oil Industry, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives Congress of the United States, March 29. Full hearing record here. A key and still relevant point raised in this testimony:

The current Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission horizontal merger guidelines focus on market share metrics that understate concentration, by failing to address the degree and importance of joint ventures and other collaborations.

2003

2003: CPTech’s 2003 reports for the RSA Competition Commission, in Hazel Tau et al.v GSK, Boehringer, et al. CPTech was the consultant to the Competition Commission staff that evaluated the Tau/TAC complaint, and investigated additional competition issues. GSK and Behringer were found to have violated RSA competition laws on three counts, including excessive pricing, refusal to license and blocking access to an essential facility. The excessive pricing case introduced a new paradigm for evaluating excessive prices on essential intellectual property goods (patented inventions on HIV drugs).

2004

2004: Essential Inventions, Inc. letter to Susan Creighton of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Competition, asking for investigation of Abbott Laboratories’ violation of antitrust laws. Abbott had raised the price of ritonavir in the United States by 400 percent, but only applied the price increase when the product was not co-formulated with Abbott’s fixed dose combination product Kalatera.

This is a “restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust laws.” International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947).

2004: Essential Invention’s Norvir/ritonavir and Xalatan/latanoprost march-in cases, on grounds that prices in United States are not reasonable.

2007

2007: KEI Comments on the XM/Sirius Merger

2007: KEI request for investigation into anticompetitive aspects of Gilead Voluntary Licenses for patents on Tenofivir and Emtricitabine, February 12.

2009

Ticketmaster/Live Nation merger

Oracle/Sun Merger

2011

2011: Wikileaks cables shows Obama Administration role in lobbying EU to approve Oracle acquisition of MySQL and other Sun assets

2012

2012: KEI files affidavit in India compulsory licensing case involving Bayer patents on cancer drug Sorafenib (Nexavar) February 14. One issue is the question: is the price of Nexavar reasonably affordable in India?

2014

2014: KEI asks FTC to investigate Shire decision to abandon efforts to compete in US market for Fabry’s disease treatments.

2014: SEPTA class action suit on excessive pricing of Sovaldi, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

2016

Xtandi excessive pricing case.

2017

Zinbryta excessive pricing case.

2018

Celgene/Juno merger

Review of the scope of 40 USC §559

KEI is asking the NIH to obtain DOJ approval of an exclusive license to Gilead for a CAR T technology, pursuant to 40 USC §559. The NIH says 40 USC §559 does not apply to the NIH use of exclusive licenses to patents.